מדינת ישראל
משרד החוץ

1051 / 3/4

אינדונזיה - ענני פנים
ממשלה

מדינת ישראל
ארכיון המדינה

ח

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Reflections on Some Weeks

in Indonesia, June 1969

Reflections on Some Weeks in Indonesia, June 1969.

1. Does one bring back from travels only what one has taken to them?

I do not think so. The mind -- if it works otherwise -- continues to work. Performs, it is true, in a daily sense, less well than at home. Because the traveller does not sleep as well, is not as rested, is not as working-day effective. But performs, in other than the day's output, sometimes better, sometimes with a productivity of a rarer kind. Because the routine inhibitors of imagining and hypothesising are, a little, set aside. And the novelty which comes to eye and ear may then open the door for new thought -- if the mind there is ready, stored and reaching to form such thought.

2. What then do I find, one week after returning to Washington, of pressing and dominant thoughts -- new or old?

Two. One about the United States. One about the "less-developed".

The one: How trivial the politico-social conflict in the US! How boring Mr. Nixon and Mr. Long. And also how trifling the student pretended-radicals and the black power pretended-militants. Win or lose -- and it is not possible that their victory should be other than limited -- little will have happened when all their noise and smoke has passed away. How like these opponents are to one another! How small the moral-social differences for which they stand.

The second: The economic "development" of the poorest countries must be understood solely as a provision of <u>means</u>. It is illusion that, by such provision, one will influence importantly the quality of the ends to which these means are put. Pure illusion that one will thereby reduce politico-social conflict. On the contrary, as man ceases to be a hungry animal, as he lifts his head from an unrewarding earth, he will find more alternative ways of life to contend over. Honor to human contention! And the development of decent, productive ways of contending is a moral-political task, in which Greeks do not fail because they are poor or Nazis succeed because they are rich. Respect for those who are assiduous to find means for man's estate! But peace does not come from Midas or wisdom from Montreal.

Well, did I know these same things before I went? Of course. But today maybe they are a little sharper, and perhaps a shade differently nuanced.

3. As previously, I find Indonesians attractive people. I feel that I communicate with them more successfully than with most people from whom I am separated by much of cultural tradition and some of personal experience. I do not sense that the Indo-

nesians with whom I have had contact have a tithe of the aggressive defensiveness so painful in most Indians and formerly (before they were so acknowledgedly successful in the world) strong also in many educated Japanese. A sagacious Frenchman said to me, in Djakarta, that Indonesians are characteristically more matter-of-factly communicative also than French people or Americans. As I was quick to recognize the probable correctness of what he asserted of his own countrymen, I was led to reflect that he might also be right about mine.

To my eyes, Indonesia has a goodly quota of handsome men and beautiful women -- most strikingly, to my vision, the latter. This makes life easier. Nothing gains by coming in an ugly sack.

In this appreciation of Indonesian beauty, I however separate myself from the Bali cult. Bali -- except partly in the dance -- rather chills me. On first contact, I thought I saw in Bali an astounding gulf between abundant craftsman's skills and meagre artistic impulse. I felt disturbed, almost frightened. How much that initial disturbance was subsequently deepened by reading Bateson and Mead on Balinese culture, I can no longer disentangle.

I had two name episodes in Indonesia. In both, I was asked whether my name was not originally German. No, I said, not German but Jewish; I am a Jew. In neither case was there a direct response. But, was it mere imagining that my Indonesian hosts then exerted themselves to be even more gracious than before?

4. I do not think of Indonesians much as participants in a world contest. Between authoritarian governments and governments of liberties. Or between Communist economies and economies of multiple enterprises. Or between Them and Us.

An able European lectured me in Djakarta -- in the swift, clear manner of one who has given this speech before -- on how important Indonesia is to the world forces of good. He enumerated four grounds: islands; regionalism; pre-emption; Christianity and Islam. How neatly he put each of them!

Islands? Geopolitics. Islands and lands by the sea, he explained: these determine human history. (Not now Mackinder's heartland!) And especially islands near the Straits of Malacca, controlling the passage to the Pacific of the oil of the Middle East -- and of so much more!

For myself, I think Geopolitics the most imbecile of politics. I would not weigh Germany much less if she were as landlocked as Czechoslovakia. And alas, in their time, the Straits of Malacca saved neither the Dutch, the British, nor the Japanese. A good harbor is the place for a good steel mill -- for him who knows how to build one. But the course of human achievement is to minimize the importance of mere geography. I do not give a fig for islands.

Regionalism? In east Asia, in 1969, this is Quatsch. There are only two potential "indigenous" leaders for such a regionalism -- China and Japan. Neither is welcomed. The attitude toward China

is dominantly one of respectful fear but lightened (perhaps especially since the Great Cultural Revolution) by such derision as one dares indulge. The attitude toward Japan is one of distrust; a fear of economic exploitation reinforces a conviction that contemporary Japan will give no support to any country in trouble -- not defense support, not political support, not support of any kind (not even Biafran Relief).

I set no considerable value on Indonesia's contribution to an east Asian regionalism to which Indonesia in fact adds almost nothing and which altogether is not of a character to survive one day without United States support.

Preemption? I admit that I am more swayed by this image than by the others. We are admittedly unable to make Indonesia a source of strength, for our side, when its government is friendly to us. But would not they -- the Chinese, the Russians -- make great strength of the riches of the Indies? What oil, what rubber, what minerals, what fertile lands, etc! etc!

Again a grain of truth and much illusion. The oil of the Indies might be a gain to the Chinese but not especially to the Russians. Chinese Communism has failed to lift decisively the economic level of its own 800 million people; why should its methods be more successful with another 115 million, among whom the association of any policy with Chinese sponsorship is a strong negative factor? Is it clear that the USSR would be strategically stronger in the 1970's with such a "foothold" in Indonesia as the Soekarno regime afforded?

I am glad that neither the Chinese nor the Russians nor their Indonesian comrades rule today in Indonesia. But I am glad primarily for the Indonesians. Little for the rest of the world. Little for us.

Christianity and Islam? My European speaker found here a valued possibility of reconciliation. He carries a special burden -- the burden of having lived for some years in North Africa, with what he judges to be an embittered, impacted, uncreative Arab nationalism. That quagmire he identifies with one Islam. And in Indonesia he is gladdened by finding another Islam, which he thinks has the stuff to turn out better.

All this one can understand. But it has here made for poor historical understanding. And also for a false attribution of values.

The development of an advanced economy in Japan was not a reconciliation of Christianity with Shintoism. The development of an advanced economy in Israel is not a reconciliation of Christianity with Judaism. The development of an advanced economy in Indonesia -- if it is achieved -- will not be a reconciliation of Christianity with Islam.

The validity of this notion of a "reconciliation" with Christianity is not enhanced if the Indonesian search is broadened to include a democratic polity and a corresponding public morality. Should this end also be achieved, it will not be Christianity and Islam that will have been reconciled.

* * *

If one is rightly concerned for the future of Indonesians, it is the concern of one man for another. If one is obligated, it is the obligation of one born lucky for the less fortunate, of the rich for the poor, of the strong for the weak.

But it is a waste of time to argue for long against those who find it necessary to support a decent concern by adducing unsound, pretendedly-realistic grounds of national advantage or private gain.

5. Indonesia needs capitalism and democracy.

Capitalism? Surely not a society in which the course of life is largely determined by the fortune of having been born into a family which owns substantial property. Surely also not a society -- like that of the United States -- in which the most prosperous fifth of all families have incomes averaging nine or ten times as great as the least prosperous fifth. But a society in which many individuals, families and small groups of people do attempt -- lawfully and with social approval -- to maximize their individual incomes by supplying scarce goods and services, by increasing their skills, by economizing, by innovating, by supplying the demands of a relatively impersonal market. (In this context, a Kibbutz too -- ignoring it may be the ministrations of the Hamashbirs and Tnuvas of this world, buying and selling and producing by its own skill and initiative -- acts, though for the account of all its members, much as another capitalist entrepreneur would.) What Hongkong and Singapore have, Indonesia needs. Needs very badly. Needs so badly that Indonesian society may be disrupted in frustration at non-accomplishment for the lack of it.

For all this, I hope that there may be many publicly-owned enterprises in Indonesia. A first fertilizer plant, in an agricultural country of 115 million people, may well be a public enterprise. Similarly, a first cement plant. Similarly, natural monopolies. Also cases where there is no sufficient private capital and entrepreneurship. Or where the external benefits of an enterprise are large but cannot be recaptured in sales.

Democracy? Let us not be more hypocritical than is required by the external forms of courtesy. Indonesia today is not a democracy but a mild-mannered military dictatorship. A dictatorship which permits its ministers to be criticized and made fun of in the public press. A dictatorship of the "Right" which permits public endorsement of every National Liberation Front, from the Provisional Government of South Vietnam to Al Fatah (see the Ampera Review, Djakarta, June 17, 1969). Not remotely so totalitarian and repressive as the military dictatorship which now governs in Maoist China. Not, I think, so divorced in sympathies from its educated classes as is the Party dictatorship which governs in Moscow. But doubtfully more democratic than is today the Yugoslavia of Tito. Like the Titoist system in maintaining a show of representative institutions by exercising central selection over who may be chosen to represent. And like the Titoist in reserving (and using) an extraordinary right to arrest without normal legal process and to judge where judges are not free from the pressure of the executive.

Mild-mannered? To whom? Let us not share the vileness of the apologists for Havana and Hanoi. Kindness is not to be judged only by conduct toward those who share the basic outlook of the local holders of effective gunpower. From my safe distance of Washington, I had not understood how actively the anti-Communist pursuit still goes on in Indonesia. There are still searches and seizures and public trials. One is told that some tens of thousands are prisoner-survivors of the failed Communist coup of September-October 1965 and of the massacre which followed it. How many tens of thousands? What kind of people are they? What have they done? I do not know.

I do not expect a democratic polity in Indonesia in the next years. Not a polity of personal liberties, defended by socially-respected law. Not one of freely formed groups and freely chosen representatives.

After all, democratic government does require a profound social consensus. It does not require a conviction either (1) that majorities are infallible or (2) that majorities have a moral-political right to work their will -- whatever that may be. But it does require a conviction that the majority which emerges from the electoral process will not inaugurate a socio-political system so bad or so immune from subsequent improvement that such a majority must not be allowed to take over the governing power. A sincere and clear-minded democrat will never -- if he has capacity to prevent it -- allow even an elected Leninist or Nazi party to take over the control of government. A democrat owes Leninists and Nazis the indulgence of indifference only where he judges their potential to be inconsequential and the moral-political costs of suppressing them correspondingly not to be worth the candle.

But, alas, the Indonesian case need not be quite one of the limits of democratic tolerance. True, in September-October 1965, Indonesian Communists -- then leaning toward Maoism -- attempted to seize power, once and for all. True, Communism is still feared in Indonesia. But it is not clear -- quite apart from the Communist coup which failed -- that all (or even most) of the present Indonesian leaders set any great value on democratic government. They have little good experience, in their country, of what has gone by this name. They probably have no great respect for the past Indonesian party leaderships and little trust in their uninformed mass public. Perhaps, driven to candor, some of them would say, as more generally John Stuart Mill, that Indonesians today are so little prepared for representative institutions that, for them, there is no better form of government than "... implicit obedience to an Akbar or a Charlemagne, if they are so fortunate as to find one."

Perhaps, for the whole 1970's, mere "implicit obedience" will not hold out. The moral-political problem may be harder than that. True, opposition has no leadership. But, in civil war, deference has been dissipated. Runaway inflation has undermined many stabilities. There will be, in the 1970's, a generation of maturing Indonesians (in age class 18, for example , about as numerous as Americans) who will be dominantly somewhat literate. They look to

be not rice hungry but still -- by the standards of the great world -- very poor. For them, few advanced employments are in near prospect. How are they to be convinced that their national society -- not abounding in individual opportunity -- is as just and as efficient as the community's talents and resources permit? How are they to make their individual lives and also make a community no more divided than most others? Stability of political institutions may here be a wish-fancy. There may be no achievable stable socio-political response to this tension of desire and accomplishment. But, if a kind of moving stability is achievable, it is my hunch that target is more likely to be reached by taking greater political risks than by calling for obedience. Risk-taking here means greater political activity and a wider, freer political participation than that provided by the Indonesia of 1969. This wager would run to more democracy. But I do not forecast.

6. Is democratic Socialism, as an independent political movement, now clearly dying -- all over the world?

Already a decade ago (Commentary, June-July 1960), I thought Socialism was probably on its way out in Europe. Now the end seems nearer -- and not only in Europe.

In east Asia, one thinks first of the large, vapid Socialist party of Japan. Nowhere else is there a Socialism of such numbers. And how completely devoid it is of all ongoing moral, social and economic content! It reflects only a resentment, a disaffiliation, and a foreign policy.

But one is more affected by the European experience and especially by the profound moral-social failure of Socialism in Britain. In Germany, only a blind man could have failed to see, even a decade ago, that -- as an independent political movement, and not merely a widely absorbed residue -- democratic Socialism was quite dead. (So dead indeed that its history may come to be written as an answer to a peculiar question: Did these dry bones ever live?) In Italy and France, the distinctly Socialist parties have been -- for two decades -- marginal forces alongside a larger Communist party which reflects the secession of much of the proletariat (and its elite) from the national polity; those Socialisms do not grow. In Scandinavia too -- where the social-equalitarian contribution of Socialism has been extensively absorbed by all parties -- the Socialisms of Norway and Denmark have now declined in electoral strength. The Socialism of Sweden -- economically successful, socially equalitarian, inward regarding and internationally abstentionist -- is hardly a force in the world. Much less a force than the outgoing Socialism of Israel. Alas for the great Socialist tradition of Europe if we are now approaching a time when one will have to point to tiny Israel as the world's best example of such bits of democratic Socialism as a thoughtful man might know and respect!

It is the British failure which works most on our minds. The leadership of British Socialism has failed -- it would appear irretrievably -- to establish a community between itself and the Labour following. This is not an economic failure. It is a

moral-social-political failure, of which economic non-accomplishment is a secondary consequence. British Socialism has failed to create a community of sympathies, outlook, culture and discourse. It follows quite naturally that British nationalized industries are morally-socially-politically no better -- perhaps, on the average, worse -- than private industries.

Where British Socialism has failed, Israeli Socialism has -- in some degree -- succeeded. Yet I recall a significant experience. A few months ago, I was arguing -- or rather sharing sorrow -- with a close Israeli friend, member of a Kibbutz, that British democratic Socialism should be such a phony. "No", he said to me, "Oscar, not British alone: all Socialism is phony". Did he mean that a considerable gap between leaders and others -- a separation in modes of life and thought -- is an inevitable characteristic of all societies, an inevitability which Socialist doctrine tends to obfuscate? I must talk to him about this again. Soon.

7. The Japanese are not liked in the circles of government in Indonesia.

Some part -- a small part, I think -- of this not being liked reflects a failure in Japanese diplomatic methods. The Japanese are courteous but -- and this is particularly true where intergovernmental negotiations are concerned -- dilatory. Where several governments are concerned, the Japanese are not uncommonly last. The Japanese are prone, in bilateral talks, to indicate agreements "in principle" which may take a long, painful time to work out -- or be reversed -- in practice. I think the Japanese would gain by rethinking their diplomatic methods. They would gain if they could achieve the image of being more prepared, clear, frank and forthcoming.

Another part -- again, I think, small -- of Japan's not being liked is the inevitable counterpart of its economic success. For seventeen or eighteen years now (since they passed prewar levels of output), the Japanese have sustained an economic expansion without equal in the experience of Europe or North America. The Japanese have shown again that they are a very great people. This success comes with habits of working hard, economizing, organizing, investigating, innovating, pushing -- habits which often cause offense in circles which do not share them. So much worse for the offended!

But there is a deeper reason why the Japanese are disliked. That is, quite simply: The Japanese drive a very hard bargain and do so by mobilizing all their power, authority and influence.

Does not everyone do the same? Yes and no. Not quite the same. The Indonesians feel that with the Japanese it is rather different. And worse. Let me give an example.

The Indonesians have recently been making a considerable number of deals with foreign investors in respect to extractive industries -- oil, copper, timber, nickel, bauxite, etc. Most of these deals have been concluded -- after announced competitions -- with Western companies, particularly American ones. The Japanese

have complained to the Indonesians, "You are giving concessions to Westerners, who will extract the minerals and then sell them to us, in Japan. Why not cut out the middle man?" To which the Indonesians reply, "We offered the deal openly. Your companies came, as an organized group, and offered us $1.00 per unit extracted. The Americans came as three separate bidders. One of them -- who has great experience -- offered [redacted] $2.00 per unit extracted. We accepted his offer. Very probably, he will indeed sell some of the output to you. But, from that sale, we will get $2.00 per unit instead of $1.00. Why should we not make the deal with him?"

The Japanese are answered but not appeased. And particularly because few deals are as simple [redacted] my story. The Japanese return to the episode, complaining. One day the complaint has a private voice. The next day the same complaint is spoken by a Japanese government officer.

The Japanese are not liked in Indonesian government circles. And the Japanese seem to be feared. Perhaps more feared than any other Power with whom daily intercourse takes place.

8. Alas for east Asian regionalism, its other great people -- the Chinese -- are objects of more deeply-rooted dislikes and fears than are the Japanese!

I do not know anything of substance of the Chinese in Indonesia. These things are hard to know, in differentiation and proportion. I have never met anybody -- or read anybody -- who I thought really knew what has happened to the various communities and allegiances of Chinese in Indonesia since 1965. And of those few to whom I have spoken who knew something, I had no reason to believe they were speaking their full minds.

Several Chinese and their friends have said that their position in Indonesia is now better than in 1965-67. Better but not equal in standing to that of non-Chinese. I have no reason to question either the improvement or the persisting inequality.

I wish I knew whether the Chinese can become an entirely constructive force in Indonesia. They are rich in entrepreneurship, as in some other talents. There is no physical resource reason why Indonesia could not be a base for several Hongkongs. But the socio-political climate for such productivity as the Chinese have displayed in Hongkong does not exist in Indonesia. And may never be created. For this object, British benevolent colonialism may be a superior rule.

9. It seems possible for a reasonable and well-informed person to have a modest optimism about Indonesian economic progress in the next years. But this progress will not reach so far as the provision of advanced employments to the millions of new entrants into the Indonesian labor force. And such economic achievement can, at best, have only [redacted] limited connection with social peace.

Let us confront this question of social peace face on, not obscuring it with irrelevant economist's learning.

The United States has recently required about 37 years to double real output per capita. (GNP per capita is officially measured, in constant 1958 prices, as $1,671 in 1929 and $3,337 in 1966.) If Indonesia were to average this same rate of economic advance, she would reach [redacted] per capita income roughly equal to that of contemporary Japan in about 150 years. This rate of economic progress, in the US, has been accompanied, at some times, by considerable social-political turbulence. But, during these 37 years, the US has not experienced political revolution or civil war. And the American political order has now attained the quiescent posture of what I call the Second Administration of Calvin Coolidge. Would the same rate of economic advance suffice to maintain equal social peace in Indonesia? Would twice such [redacted] rate -- yielding [redacted] standard of living like that of contemporary Japan by around the year 2044 -- be [redacted] guarantee against bloody civil war? How about four times the US rate of advance?

Thoughtfully considered, such questions answer themselves. They are then seen to be badly-posed questions. No rate of economic advance guarantees social peace or even freedom from bloody civil war. Social peace is a moral-political achievement. Economic advance matters to this achievement not by its speed but only in [redacted] far [redacted] such advance contributes to convincing the politically effective forces in a society that their social-economic-political order deserves support, or should be moderately altered, [redacted] should be drastically transformed -- by civil war, if need be.

One need not share in that characteristic silliness of our time which consists in misunderstanding and overrating the consequences of economic accomplishments.

* * *

We are told, by competent people, that Indonesia is much less likely to be a country of hunger in the 1970's than in the recent past. Indeed she is likely to become -- at least temporarily -- a country of rice surplus. Surplus in relation to customary consumption and the slow rise of buyers' incomes. (In this, Indonesia is of course a participant in the revolution of -- at least temporary -- emancipation from brute hunger which is now affecting the whole of southeast Asia, from the Philippines through Pakistan.) The change involves an increase in Indonesian rice output by something of the general order of 50% from 1967 to 1974*, during [redacted] period when population would rise by rather less than 20%. Basic are the new varieties of rice (as elsewhere also of wheat and corn) and the provision of the related supplies of seeds, fertilizers, irrigation water, facilities for storage and

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* The official Plan for 1973/74 calls for a gain of two-thirds over 1967.

milling, etc. etc. Many able people are working on these things. I do not pretend to a judgment separate from theirs. The optimists among them believe that, in Indonesia, already by 1972 a basic rice surplus will have emerged which, they believe, must bring about a downward revision of further food and fertilizer programs. The pessimists -- counting more largely [redacted] bad luck and the incompetence of governments -- believe that [redacted] surplus will not be confirmed until 1974 or even 1975. In either case, this surplus will mean a redundancy of agricultural labor -- adding to the normal growth of the labor supply which will need non-farm employments.

In respect to export earnings, I have [redacted] hunch that current official Indonesian estimates may well turn out to be too modest. These estimates envision a rise of more than 50% from 1967 to 1974 (from $605 million to $924 million, with oil treated net). My guess is that the rise may be much greater. [redacted] suspect that especially offshore oil and perhaps also onshore oil will do better than has been allowed for; perhaps other extractive industries will also make [redacted] larger contribution. If so (and if Indonesia's old debts have meanwhile been deferred), the country will have greater foreign exchange resources than are counted on in current published plans. But it will not have greatly more of advanced employment opportunities. Modern extractive industries do not employ many people. The whole US mining industry, which contributes about $6½ billion to the US National Income (roughly equivalent to two-thirds of the whole National Income of Indonesia) employs only about 625,000 people. A booming Indonesian extractive industry will be adding employment in the tens of thousands while the country's labor force is growing in the millions.

10. A foreigner concerned with economic matters in a poor country is likely to be involved primarily with enterprises of advanced technology, requiring large amounts of capital. Being so involved, he is separated from the activities in earning their livings which necessarily engage the great majority of people in this society to which he is alien. And his native associates and counterparts, in so far [redacted] their concentration is the same as the foreigner's, are also looking away from the enterprises in which their ordinary countrymen must spend their working days.

When I was in Indonesia this time, I was concerned with a steel plant, a natural gas pipeline, and a fertilizer plant. I spent some of my free time talking to petroleum people. Without effort, I could gossip with colleagues and friends about a new cement plant, a copper exploration, or an electric power installation. The least heavily capitalized of these enterprises involves [redacted] investment of something like $50,000 per worker. Offshore oil exploration is so extensively a thing of foreign supplies, foreign maintenance and foreign workers that it may spend something approaching $250,000,000 before directly employing 1,000 Indonesian workers! Some heavily capitalized enterprises are indeed keys to much else. An electric power plant may be. A fertilizer plant also, though perhaps involving an investment of $60,000,000, can earn large profits, at competitive international prices, and supply a ma-

terial valuable to millions of farmers. Still, such a $60,000,000 enterprise — however valuable -- need not employ 1000 people. Most Indonesians in non-farm employment will have, for many years, to work in manufacturing, construction and service enterprises capitalized, at best, in the range of $2,000 per worker, not $60,000. Their lives will not be shaped by advanced technology.

I do not suggest a productive path, for the foreigner, which leads away from his primary involvement with advanced technology and high capitalization. For him, I doubt that such a path commonly exists. I am not making a covert apology for the Peace Corps: I think the Peace Corps a false path. I do not value unskilled international missionaries of good will, whatever their personal sincerity. I think these — like other missionaries -- if they are stubbornly naive, and refuse to see how little they contribute, may persist in saving their own unperceptive souls, but they rarely help the heathen. Mere people-to-people mass missions are twaddle. It is expensive and unproductive for unskilled or semi-skilled Americans to go share their deficiencies of skill with alien cultures. In every country, mass elementary training must be done by those who are accepted as countrymen. The foreigner can, of course, participate in training the trainers. Sometimes he does that well, under special conditions, abroad. But such advanced training is itself a specialized and expensive thing. Like other specialization, its working day only brushes against the life of the common man-- and even when it bends, for a moment, to show him, by manual example.

I did not come to know ordinary Indonesians better during these few weeks. The only ordinary folk I met were service people -- drivers, hotel workers, waiters. I do not expect to have greatly different experience another time.

July 1969 Oscar Gass
Washington, D.C.

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קנברה, 11 באוקטובר 1968

אל : הגב' חן שפירא, מאסו"ק

מאת : השגרירות, קנברה

חנה יקרה,

הנדון: איגדובזיה

סוף סוף עלה בידי להיעזר לבקשתך מ-5.8 והנני שולח לך בזה הצלום הודעת העתונות בעניין הקניבס האיגדובזי החדש.

בברכת מודים לשסחה,

שמעון עבל

העתק: מאסוק
חקר

INFORMATION SERVICE INDONESIA

Indonesian Newsletter

11 June, 1968.

No : 68/21.

SPECIAL RELEASE

PRESIDENT SUHARTO INSTALLS NEW CABINET

President Suharto announced the appointment of the new 'Development Cabinet' Ministers on Thursday evening June 6, comprising twenty-three Ministers, five of whom are Ministers without portfolios.

The composition of the new Cabinet includes 11 intelectuals, 5 religious scholars and 7 military officers. Categorically the Ministers can be divided into three groups, namely those who are; members of political parties/mass organisations (8 Ministers), members of the armed services (6 Ministers) and non-party members (9 Ministers).

The full composition of the 'Development Cabinet' is as follows:-

Minister for Home Affairs, Lt.Gen. Basuki Rachmat.
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Hadji Adam Malik.
Minister for Justice, Prof. Umar Senoadji S.H.
Minister for Information, Air Vice Marshal Budiardjo.
Minister for Finance, Prof. Dr. Ali Wardhana.
Minister for Trade, Prof. Dr. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo.
Minister for Agriculture, Prof.Dr. Ir. Thojib Hadiwidjaja.
Minister for Industries, Maj.-Gen. M. Jusuf.
Minister for Mining, Prof. Ir. Sumantri Brodjonegoro.
Minister for Public Works & Electricity, Ir. Sutami.
Minister for Communications, Drs. Frans Seda.
Minister for Education and Culture, Mashuri S.H.
Minister for Health, Prof.Dr. G.A. Siwabessy.
Minister for Religious Affairs, K.H. Mohamad Dahlan.
Minister for Manpower, Rear Admiral Mursalin.
Minister for Social Affairs, Dr. A.H. Tambunan.
Minister for Transmigration/Co-operatives Lt.-Gen. Sarbini.

The five other State Ministers without portfolios are appointed to assist the President in the co-ordination of Government activities which require special technical supervision and constant attention. These Ministers are:-

State Minister for Economic, Financial and Industrial Affairs, Sri Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX.
State Minister for People's Welfare, K.H. Dr. Idham Chalid.
State Minister in charge of Perfecting & Purging State Apparatuses, H. Harsono Tjokroaminoto.
State Minister in charge of Supervision of State Projects, Prof. Dr. Sunawar Sukowati S.H.
State Minister in charge of Liaison between Government, Congress, Parliament & Supreme Advisory Council, [illegible] S.H.

In his message explaining the structure of the new Cabinet, President Suharto said that the post of Presidential Secretary had been abolished although it has no direct connection with the task of the Cabinet.

The President also said, that in choosing the personnel of the newly formed Cabinet, he had received valuable suggestions from leaders of political parties, mass organisations and prominent figures. Consultation had also been held with chairmen of political parties whose members sit in the new Cabinet. This Cabinet consists of ministers who are experts, chosen for qualifications and capabilities in their respective fields.

The official installation of the 'Development Cabinet' was held on Monday, June 10 at the State Palace.

During the installation ceremony, President Suharto stated that the primary tasks of the Development Cabinet are:

- realisation of political and economic stability.
- realisation of the Five-Year Development Plan.
- restoration of security and order and eradication of the remnants of the Gestapu/P.K.I.

. . . . . .

חאג, יח' בחשרי תשכ"ט
10 באוקטובר 1968

משרד החוץ
18. X. 1968
דואר נכנס

אל : מר זאב אשל, המנהל

מאת: היזקן, האג

הנדון: אינדונזיה

בשבועון השמאלי רב-ההפצה Vrij Nederland חופיע ב-5 לח"ז מאמר ארוך על הפורות שחלו באחרונה באינדונזיה ואשר הביאו המדינה להלוויה לחלוטין באותן המדינות המערביות המסייעות בידיה להתגבר על מצבה הכלכלי הקשה.

לצערי אין באפשרותי לתרגם את המאמר אך מובטחני כי המצאו מישהו (אולי חיים רוש) שיוכל לעשות זאת בנעל. בכל מקום, נראה לי שהדבר כדאי.

ב ב ר ב ה ,

יעקב ינאי

העתק: מאסו"ק
אירופה ז

1081
סודי

ירושלים, כ"ח באב תשכ"ח
19 באוגוסט 1968

אל: הממונה על האסיר הפוליטי

מאת: מ"מ מנהל אמצ"ק

נדון: הסמכות השיפוטית בשיגרונות

... רס"ב עקיבה [redacted] בנדון.

[redacted] - לידיעתכם בלבד.

בברכה,

יהודה הרל

העתק מסור: מר א. כהן, המרכז

ס ו ד ר

ה ס ו ס ד

כ אב תשכ"ח
14 אוג 1968

72 - 4757

מר מ. אראל, מנהל מאסו"ק, משה"ח

אנא 1.50

הנדון: אינדונזיה - המשלה החדשה

רצ"כ סקירה מסכמת בנדון. אוכלו להעכיר את הסקירה לנציגויות באדר, בהתאם לשיקולכם, אך נבקשכם להדגיש כי החומר הוא לידיעתם בלבד.

ב ב ר כ ה,

א. כהן

כ ו ד ר

אוגוסט 1966

א י נ ד ו נ ז י ה

ממשלת הפיתוח

1. ממשלתה החדשה של אינדונזיה המכונה "ממשלת הפיתוח" הוצגה ב-6 ביוני 66. על הקמת ממשלת פיתוח (ממשלת מומחים) הוחלט ביעיבתו הראשונה של הפרלמנט במרץ 68. ביום הקמת הממשלה החדשה הודיע סוהרטו על ביטול ה- SPRI - צוות עוזריו ויועציו הפרטיים.

שינויים במבנה הממשלה

2. 11 מבין חברי הממשלה החדשה לא היו חברים בממשלה הקודמת.

3. נוספו לממשלה 3 שרי מדינה (על השניים שהיו בממשלה הקודמת).

4. 6 מן החיקים הכלכליים אוחדו ל-3 (רשימת חברי הממשלה מופיעה בנספח).

5. את הרקע להיווצרותו של המבנה הנוכחי ניתן לראות בעובדות דלהלן:-

א. הכשלון במדיניות הכלכלית של הממשלה הקודמת והחלטת הפרלמנט שלוותה בהצהרותיהם החוזרות של סוהרטו, מנהיגי המשטר החדש, הסטודנטים ודעת הקהל על הצורך בהקמת ממשלת מומחים שחבריה יהיו בעלי עבר נקי משחיתות.

ב. לחצי הפלגות שהתעוררו ביתר שאת עם החלטת הפרלמנט, אשר סללה את הדרך להגדלת מספר האזרחים ולהקטנת מספרם של נציגי הכוחות המזוייגים בממשלה.

ג. הסגמה הכללית של סוהרטו להפגין נסיגה מן האופי המיליטריסטי של הממשל ולשתף בו מספר רב של אזרחים (9 מבין 11 השרים החדשים הם אזרחים). אותה מגמה הניאה לפיזור ה- SPRI (צוות יועציו הצבאיים של סוהרטו) שהואשם בגטילת סמכויות הממשלה ובניהול מדיניות כלכלית ופנימית עצמאית (ראה סע' 1).

6. הבולט מבין המינויים החדשים, הן מנקודת ראות כלכלית והן מן האספקט הפוליטי-הפנימי - הינו ללא ספק מינויו של הפרופסור מוסימרו כשר המסחר החוץ. הוא כיהן כבר בתפקידים כלכליים בממשלות קודמות (בסביבת ה-50) ומאחר והוגלה מאינדונזיה בתקופת המרד נגד סוקרנו ב-1957, הינו נקי מכל אשמת השתייכות למשטר הישן. הפרופסור הינו דמות כלכלית ידועה באינדונזיה ומחוצה לה, ואינדונזים רבים מייחסים לו תכונות של אשף כלכלי. ואמנם מיד עם הכנסו לתפקיד הוציא שורה של תקנות הדשות המכוונות למנוע בל אפשרות של שלטול כספי הציבור לכיסים פרטיים, ולבטל פריבילגיות בתחום היבוא אשר מהן נהנו כמה מן הסקטורים הכלכליים, ובמיוחד הצבא. כמו כן העלה את מסי המגן על יבוא מוצרים על-מנת לתת תנופה לייצור המקומי ונקט בצעדים לפישוט ההליכי הבנקאות.

7. המפתח למינוייהם של שרי המדינה החדשים הוא מפלגתי. מפלגותיהם לא היו מיוצגות בממשלות הקודמות של סוהרטו:

א. TJOKROAMINOTO מפלגת P.S.I.D. - מפלגה מוסלמית קיצונית.

ב. SOEKOWATI - ממפלגה P.N.I. - המפלגה הלאומית.

ג. MINTAREDJA מפלגת P.M.I. - המפלגה המוסלמית המאוחדת (נמנה על סלג ה- MUHAMADIJA של המפלגה).

8. WARDANA נכנס לקבינטריה של מינויי המומחים יחד עם הפרופסור סוסימרו (סעיף 6).

9. מינרייהם של MURSALIN ו- BUDIARJO הינם צבאיים והם מייצגים (בהתאם לסדר הופעתם) את חילות הים והאויר. סוהרטו הוציא מידי חיל הים את המינוסטריון לענינים ימיים כדי לנטל את השפעתו החזקה של חיל הים, שכן אלמנטים פרו-סוקרניים. בידי הצבא עתה 6 תיקים בלבד (4 מהם בידי נציגי חיל היבשה) - המספר הקטן ביותר מאז עלה סוהרטו לשלטון. תיק הפנים נשאר בידי Lt. Gen. RACHMAT BASUKI , אות למגמה להשאיר ביבתיים את מערכת היחסים שבין השלטון המרכזי והמחוזות בידי הצבא. הצבא מחזיק בתיק אחד בלבד מתוך 7 תיקי הכלכלה, לעומת 5 מתוך 10 בממשלה הקודמת.

10. הכוחות הפוליטיים העיקריים, אשר תלו תקוות רבות בממשלה החדשה, מגלים כבר בשלב זה הסתייגויות כבדות משקל:

א. המפלגות טוענות כי קושחו בחלוקת התיקים מאחר ואין בידיהן אף אחד מן התיקים החשובים ומאחר ואנשיהן נבחרו ללא כל התייעצות עמן ואינם מהווים אישים המייצגים את מפלגותיהם. יצויין עם זאת כי למפלגות המוסלמיות נוספו שני נציגים בממשלה.

ב. הצבא (וגורמים אזרחיים המרכזים בידיהם עמדות מפתח בכלכלה האינדונזית) ממורמר על התקנות החדשות של סוסיסרו, אשר אינן מאפשרות עוד משוא פנים לסקטורים מיוחדים (בעיקר הצבא) ליבא סחורות ללא מכס.

ג. אין זו ממשלת מומחים טהורה (נוסף לסינויים הפוליטיים השאיר סוהרטו בתפקידו גם את Maj. Gen. JUSUF , אעפ"י שהוכיח את אזלת ידו, וזאת כהוקרה על שרותיו בעבר) ואנשים הידועים כמנהגי השחיתות שלהם ממשיכים לכהן בה (למשל CHALID). עובדה זו עלולה לעורר מחדש את זעם הסטודנטים.

11. לעומת הביקורת של המפלגות וטל חלק מן הצבא, מצביעים מינ"יו של הפרופ' סוסיסרו והמינויים הפוליטיים והטכנוקראטיים על חיזוק מעמדו של סוהרטו, שהעז ואף הצליח לכפות את רצונו בקביעת המועמדים לחברות בממשלה החדשה.

12. הרוחות מוקטות למעשה וקיים רצון לתת לממשלה החדשה להוכיח את עצמה. את זאת ניתן לזקוף לא במעט לזכות האמונה הגדולה ביכולתו של הפרופ' סוסיסרו להולל שינויים מרחיקי לכת במצבה הכלכלי של המדינה.

13. חשיבות רבה מיוחסת לעובדה פרוקו של "הצוות האישי" (SPRI - Private Staff) של סוהרטו, אשר ריכז בידיו סמכויות ביצוע נרחבות בתקופה הממשלה הקודמת. מרבית חברי ה- SPRI לשעבר, ובכללם הגנרל ALAMSJAH (כיום מזכיר הממשלה) איבדו מסמכויותיהם וירדו במעמדם. גרם שלושה מהם נחשבים גם כיום כבעלי השפעה מכרעת על סוהרטו, בתוקף תפקידם כיועציו האישיים: מייג'ור ג'נרל SURJO (בעניני כספים), מייג'ור ג'נרל HUMAR DANI (בעניני כלכלה) ובריגדיר ג'נרל ALI MURTOPO (מודיעין ועניינים מיוחדים).

0 9 0)

Development Cabinet

(Announced 6th June 1968)

1. Prime Minister, Defence and Security : General Suharto

STATE MINISTERS in charge of :

2.	Economic, Financial and Industrial	: Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX.
3.	People's Welfare	: K.H. Dr. Idham Chalid.
4.	Perfecting and improving State Apparatus	: H. Harsone Tjokroaminoto
5.	Supervising State Projects	: Prof. Dr. Soenawar Soekowati.
6.	Relations between the Government, Congress, Parliament and Supreme Advisory Council	: H. Mintaredja

Ministersof :

7.	Home Affairs	: Lieut. Gen. Basuki Rachmat
8.	Foreign Affairs	: Adam Malik
9.	Information	: Air Vice Marshall Boediardjo
10.	Finance	: Prof. Ali Wardana
11.	Trade	: Prof. Dr. Sumitro Djojohadi Kusumo
12.	Justice	: Prof. Oemar Seno Adji S.H.
13.	Health	: Prof. Dr. G.A. Siwabessy
14.	Communication	:Dr Frans Seda
15.	Education	: Mashuri S.H.
16.	Social Affairs	: Dr. A.M. Tanbunan S.H.
17.	Mining	: Prof. Dr. Soemantri Brodjonegor
18.	Industry	: Maj. Gen. M. Jusuf
19.	Agriculture	: Prof. Thojob Hadiwidjaja
20.	Religion	: H. Moh. Dachlan
21.	Manpower	: Vice Admiral Mursalin
22.	Transmigration/Cooperatives	: Lt. Gen. Sarbini.

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[illegible]

(Approved [illegible])

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